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This article first predicts, on the basis of an analysis of deep absorption, a number of 
features of mystical and related states of consciousness. It then observes that these 
very same features appear in beliefs held by people who have never experienced deep 
absorption. Moreover, many people engage in activities that, though not normally 
leading to deep absorption, bring about lesser states of absorption. The article will 
propose an answer to the question how it is that many people are influenced in their 
beliefs and practices by experiences (deep absorption) they have not had.
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1 Introduction
This article first predicts, on the basis of an analysis of deep absorption, a num-
ber of features of mystical and related states of consciousness. It then observes 
that these very same features appear in beliefs held by people who have never 
experienced deep absorption. Moreover, many people engage in activities that, 
though not normally leading to deep absorption, bring about lesser states of 
absorption. The article will propose an answer to the question how it is that 
many people are influenced in their beliefs and practices by experiences (deep 
absorption) they have not had.1
1   The crucial concept in this article is mental absorption. Since no way to measure depth of 
absorption in neurophysiological terms is available as yet, neuropsychology turns out to be 
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2 Absorption and Mystical Experience
What is absorption? Absorption is another name for the faculty of concen-
tration or focused attention.2 This faculty enables humans (and many other 
animals) to fix their minds on something specific and exclude or reduce as-
sociative links (including non-pertinent sense impressions) (e.g., Desimone & 
Duncan 1995). The exclusion or reduction of associative links is the aspect of 
absorption to be discussed in the following pages.3 We know this aspect of ab-
sorption from everyday experience and from numerous experiments—among 
which that of the “invisible gorilla” is well known (Chabris & Simons 2010).4 
Indeed, “attention is regarded as a limited power supply. The basic idea is that 
attention represents a general-purpose limited capacity that can be flexibly 
allocated in many different ways in response to task demands.” (Eysenck 1982: 
28). “Any intensification of focal attention necessitates the elimination of dis-
tracting or irrelevant stimuli…. We not only pay attention to our given task but 
also ward off distractions.” (Spiegel & Spiegel 2004: 19). Attention, moreover, 
appears to be domain-general, i.e., it is to a large extent shared between men-
tal processes regardless of the nature of the information involved (Vergauwe, 
Barrouillet & Camos 2010).
Concentration excludes or reduces mental associations that we could be 
aware of if we were not concentrating on something else. However, there 
are also mental associations that we could not be aware of and which nev-
ertheless play a role in ordinary awareness. Our awareness is “colored” (with-
out us being aware of the coloring) by memories, expectations and concepts 
to which we do not have immediate conscious access; it is colored by other 
mental contents, some of which are not conscious: “studies have shown that 
unconscious processing can influence awareness.” (Berlin 2011: 6). The men-
tal associations we are not aware of are responsible for the fact that ordinary 
awareness is interpreted awareness. Numerous authors have observed this 
(among others Lotto 2017; Searle 2010; Hoffman 1998; 2012; Dennett 2017: 169 f., 
of little use to support or refute the theory presented (see §7 and note 14). The use of theories 
that base themselves on the presumed evolutionary benefits of certain behaviors and beliefs 
will be discussed in §7.
2   When discussing the effects of deep absorption (as we will do below), I prefer absorption to 
attention. Research has shown that there can be unconscious attention (see, e.g., Chou & Yeh 
2012); this does not appear to be true of deep absorption.
3   The focusing aspect of absorption will not be dealt with; it may need a study of its own. It 
is possible, but not certain, that this focusing aspect is responsible for the way attention is 
known to affect appearances (Watzl 2019).
4   For a neuronal model of “inattentional blindness”, see Dehaene & Changeux 2005.
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with a reference to Mordvintsev et al. 2015): “What I perceive are not the crude 
and ambiguous cues that impinge from the outside world onto my eyes and my 
ears and my fingers. I perceive something much richer—a picture that com-
bines all these crude signals with a wealth of past experience.” (Frith 2007: 
132). “We perceive through our sensory organs, to be sure, but no less through 
our concepts; in other words, we perceive not just physiologically but also 
intellectually.” (Hofstadter & Sander 2013: 171).5 Among the elements that “feed 
into” awareness, proprioception and interoception deserve special mention. 
They are responsible for the constant implicit presence of a person’s body in 
their awareness, and they contribute to the resulting sense of self. Indeed, “in-
teroceptive re-representations … substantialize (that is, provide de basis for) 
all subjective feelings from the body and perhaps emotional awareness, …”. 
(Craig 2009: 59; see further Craig 2015). Emotions play a role in determining 
how we experience the world; interestingly, these too are made rather than 
passively experienced (Barrett 2017). Mood can have a measurable effect on 
visual perception, and this confirms, once again, that ordinary awareness is 
interpreted awareness, and that this interpretation can be variable (Antinori, 
Carter & Smillie 2017). Culture, too, can have an effect on the way we process 
the world (Nisbett 2003). Numbers, for example, influence awareness in the 
cultures that have them (Everett 2017).
It follows that sensory and other impressions that we become aware of are 
ordered and made sense of in the light of earlier experiences and reflections 
even before we become aware of them.6 Our experiences, therefore, are em-
bedded in webs of associations that connect them with other mental contents. 
Searle (2010: 31-32; 2015: 36 ff.) speaks in this connection of the Network or 
the Background, and says in his latest book (2015: 73): “What I am arguing is 
that the interpretation of a visual experience … will be a function of the con-
ceptual apparatus that the interpreter brings to the experience.” Indeed, “[i]n 
conscious perception, images are continually called up from memory, then 
modified by the new, incoming sensory information into an updated image of 
the world as it is being experienced.” (Feinberg & Mallatt 2016: 2583). The driv-
ing force behind these associations appears to be analogy, which some look 
upon as the core of cognition (Hofstadter & Sander 2013; Leech, Mareschal & 
Cooper 2008).
These considerations confirm that awareness is by its nature variable. It 
varies, of course, depending on what it is ‘about’: the awareness of a table is 
5   The “inner” contribution to perception is so important that the mere thought of a bright light 
changes the size of one’s pupils; Zokaei et al. 2019.
6   This and the following paragraph occur in similar words in Bronkhorst 2017: 6.
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different from the awareness of a chair. More importantly, it also varies in ac-
cordance with the conscious or unconscious associations that contribute to it: 
Marcel Proust’s awareness of the cakes called petites madeleines was colored 
by memories from his childhood, and no doubt different from the way others 
(or he himself at other occasions) would perceive these cakes. And our normal 
perception of a banknote is colored by mental associations that assign value 
to it: those who do not have these associations will see only a piece of paper. 
In fact, one has to draw on past experience even to know that it is paper. This 
coloring is perhaps most prominent in our awareness of other human beings: 
we experience our mother, or our monarch (if we have one), not just as the 
persons they are, but also in terms of the social roles they play.7
This takes us back to absorption. Is it possible for concentration to expand 
into the realm of mental associations that one is not ordinarily aware of? Is it 
in the nature of concentration to only reduce or suppress mental associations 
that are accessible to consciousness, or can it go beyond these? If the former, 
absorption will not be able to reduce or suppress mental associations that are 
not accessible to consciousness. In the latter case, must we assume that ab-
sorption can do so, but requires, or is facilitated by, an expansion of the realm 
of mental associations accessible to consciousness?
These are important questions, which will occupy us later in this study. 
Until then, we will simply assume that deep absorption can indeed reduce or 
suppress mental associations with contents and inputs of which we are not 
normally aware, which lie below the threshold of consciousness, but which yet 
do play a role in ordinary awareness. Since these associations contribute to the 
way we cognize the world and ourselves, mental absorption, if deep enough, 
must then be expected to have cognitive effects.
What cognitive effects can we expect a strong reduction of such mental as-
sociations to have? Ordinary awareness, as we have seen, is interpreted aware-
ness, which means that experiences are embedded in webs of associations. A 
weakening of these webs should give rise to differently interpreted experience. 
This will then affect both our experience of the outside world and of ourselves. 
Let us consider these separately.
The experience of our surroundings is colored by various associations. 
When we see a cup, we recognize it as a cup, we implicitly know what a cup 
is for, etc. If and when the associative connections with past experiences fall 
away, we may see the same cup, but we will not recognize (i.e., re-cognize) it as 
7   We are not at present concerned with the question what mental associations color our 
awareness (some of which may be determined by our cultural background), but rather with 
the observation that mental associations do so.
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a cup. We will not know what it is for and, to put it briefly, we may experience 
it as something totally novel. Since language plays a role in creating the asso-
ciations that contribute to the interpretation of experience,8 experience may 
present itself as ineffable, beyond the realm of words. Experience will now be 
differently—perhaps one can say: less—interpreted, and therefore different. 
This new experience, being freed of the “burden” of associated mental con-
tents, may be felt as being more real, or even as giving access to a reality differ-
ent from the reality experienced in ordinary states of mind.9
There are further consequences. Since ordinary awareness is colored by 
memories, expectations and other concepts, awareness without (or with less) 
coloring of that kind may be experienced as involving a different sense of time, 
or even as timeless, as an eternal present. Ordinary awareness situates itself be-
tween past and future and is therefore experienced as having limited duration. 
Without such a temporal context, time itself will be experienced differently.
Deep absorption will also affect the sense of self. The awareness of ourselves 
accompanies us in all “normal” states of awareness, but is a construction built 
on the basis of numerous experiences, memories and other concepts.10 It de-
pends on a large number of associative connections. Several thinkers empha-
size the narrative nature of this sense of self (e.g. Dennett 1991: 417-18). Bruce 
Hood (2012: 60) emphasizes the importance of memories:
Our identity is the sum of our memories, but it turns out that memories 
are fluid, modified by context and sometimes simply confabulated. This 
means we cannot trust them and our sense of self is compromised. Note 
how this leaves us with a glaring paradox—without a sense of self, mem-
ories have no meaning, and yet the self is a product of our memories.
Hood argues at length that the self is an illusion, and observes (p. 214):
The self illusion depends on stored information that has been acquired 
during a lifetime. These are our memories that are constructed as we in-
terpret the world. That interpretation is guided by mechanisms that seek 
out certain information in the world but also by those around us who 
help us to make sense of it all.
8    This issue is explored in Bronkhorst 2010 / 2012a.
9    On the “reality” of this different “reality”, see Appendix 1.
10   Watzl (2018) argues that all forms of consciousness reveal a phenomenal self in active 
attention.
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Since it weakens associative connections, deep absorption is likely to break 
through this illusion, with profound effects on the way we experience our-
selves and the world.
Antonio Damasio distinguishes between core consciousness and extended 
consciousness. The former is of a nonverbal nature. However, autobiographical 
consciousness relies extensively on language (Damasio 2010: 172). Indeed,
language contributes massively to the way we experience the world, in 
particular to our sense of the self as our narrative center in the past and 
present. But our basic experience of the world does not depend on it.
Koch 2019: 1036
With the weakening or disappearance of autobiographical consciousness, con-
sciousness as such does not disappear, but it will be without a sense of self, or 
with a reduced or modified sense of self.11
The disassociation from the autobiographical sense of self has an impor-
tant consequence, viz. that one is no longer associated with what one has 
done and what one is going to do. What is more, one no longer identifies with 
one’s actions.
This analysis of the cognitive effects of a weakened web of mental asso-
ciations, as simple as it may appear, draws attention to a potential realm of 
experience that is far removed from the ordinary experience of most people 
in their daily lives. This realm of experience, if and to the extent it is produced 
by sufficiently deep absorption, may be reported as being characterized by the 
following features:
(i) access to a different, “higher”, reality;
(ii) a different sense of time, perhaps culminating in a sense of timelessness;
(iii) a different sense of self, potentially separating one’s self from one’s 
actions;
(iv) ineffability.
Our analysis also shows that this extraordinary realm of experience is not just 
something that a dysfunctional brain might produce in its unfortunate owner. 
On the contrary, such experience is the predictable outcome of entering into a 
state of mental absorption, if only this state is deep enough.
11   This is not quite how Damasio puts it when he says, e.g., that “if one is awake and there 
are contents in one’s mind, consciousness is the result of adding a self function” (p. 166). 
However, his core consciousness is “the sense of the here and now, unencumbered by 
much past and by little or no future. It revolves around a core self and is about person-
hood but not necessarily identity.” (p. 168; my emphasis).
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Can there be states of mental absorption of such depth in real people? States 
whose depth is such that there are noticeable cognitive effects do not normally 
affect most of us. On the other hand, many people experience states of absorp-
tion of some depth (e.g., Hardy 1979; Hay 1990; The Mystical Experience Registry 
[http://www.bodysoulandspirit.net/mystical_experiences/]).12 They are often 
referred to as “religious experiences” (“deemed religious”; Taves 2009),13 which 
can be of varying depths. Absorption also accompanies hypnotic trance, the 
state called “flow”, intense prayer, orgasm and much else. Absorption in many 
of those is not particularly deep.14
All of this complicates the task of verifying the claim that deep absorp-
tion can be responsible for the features enumerated above. As it is, we have 
so far little beyond impressions to go by. But these impressions are not 
worthless. Accounts by religious mystics who claim to have lived through 
deep mystical experiences (i.e., deep absorption) frequently mention these 
features, even though obviously adapted to their religious and cultural con-
texts. Already William James (1902: 367) drew attention to the ineffability of 
mystical experiences. Another feature he emphasized is the noetic quality of 
these experiences, providing “insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the 
discursive intellect”. This corresponds, of course, to knowledge of a “higher”, 
or “deeper”, reality that we expect, on the basis of our earlier reflections, states 
of deep absorption to provide. The changing sense of self, which our analysis 
makes us expect, is so central that Evelyn Underhill (1911) dedicated a major 
part of her classical study of European mysticism to it, with chapter head-
ings such as “The Awakening of the Self”, “The Purification of the Self”, “The 
12   Hay (1990: 79 ff.) gives “international statistics” that suggest that religious experiences 
are far from uncommon.
13   Not always. See, e.g., Austin 1998: 71: “during rare moments, […] meditators may […] make 
a major shift into an extraordinarily different mode. It is a shift that carries the proper-
ties of clarity, persistence, and concentration far beyond their ordinary limits. Now, as 
attention transforms itself, […] it reaches that state called absorption. […] Absorptions 
convey the sense of being held, transfixed, and riveted. It is a process during which extra, 
concentrated energy involuntarily infuses the act of attention.” See also Austin 2006: 
313 ff.
14   There is no generally accepted objective (e.g., neurophysiological) scale measuring the 
depth of absorption. Even if there were one, it would be difficult to use it in many of 
the most interesting instances: Experiences that can sometimes reach great depths of 
absorption—especially religious experiences—tend to arrive at unforeseen moments. 
Cp. Ott’s (2007: 262) observation, that is still true today: “standards for the definition and 
assessment of states of absorption have not been established thus far.” Watzl (2011: 847) 
draws attention to some of the difficulties: “Scientific research … suggests that the class of 
sub-personal attentional processes is highly diverse and not well localized in the brain.” 
See below (§7) for the need for neurophysiological measurements of depth of absorption.
8 10.1163/15700682-12341504 | Bronkhorst
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion  (2020) 1-41
Illumination of the Self”. The different experience of time that we expect is 
frequently expressed, for example in a preoccupation with Eternity (Underhill 
1911: passim).
Let me add at this point, perhaps superfluously, that the features here dis-
cussed will be interpreted, or even experienced, in ways that are colored by the 
cultural context of the person concerned, and by their personal life-history. 
The present article does not deal with these coloring factors and is exclusively 
concerned with the underlying features that find expression through these 
colorings.
Scholars have tried to determine the “common core” of mysticism, without 
coming to an agreement (e.g. Stace 1960: 44, 79, 110-111, 131-132; Kimmel 2008). 
Their search is not ours, for we are not looking for a universal core of mys-
ticism. Our search is more modest and can be more easily confronted with 
the data. Our theory predicts that the features identified above have a certain 
likelihood to appear in reports of those who have undergone states of deep 
absorption. They do not need to appear in all such reports. Nor do we need to 
worry whether the authors of these reports were all of them bona fide mystics 
(i.e., people who had really experienced states of deep absorption): many may 
not have been (see below; §3). The regular appearance of these features in re-
ports of those who claim or were generally believed to have undergone deep 
mystical experiences is at present the best we can hope for. And this hope is 
amply fulfilled.
Religious mystics are not the only ones to provide evidence for what the 
experience of deep absorption is like. Hypnotism does not usually go that 
deep, but in exceptional cases it does. Tart’s (1983: 191-200) account of a stu-
dent (“William”) who reached extraordinary depths of hypnotic trance is of 
great interest. William “reports that after a depth of 50 [on the Extended North 
Carolina Scale; JB] it does not make sense to ask him about physical relaxation 
because he is no longer identified with his body; his body is ‘just a thing, some-
thing I’ve left behind.’ One does not rate the relaxation of things.” After a depth 
of 60 “there is no longer a self to be peaceful or not peaceful”; “his ordinary 
identity continues to decrease until around 80 or 90 he feels that his ordinary 
identity is completely in abeyance: ‘William’ no longer exists.” Regarding time, 
“William feels time passing more and more slowly in a linear fashion as he goes 
down to about 40…. William feels that time suddenly ceases to be a meaning-
ful concept for him: at 50 he is no longer in time, his experiences are somehow 
timeless, they do not have a duration or a place, an order in the scheme of 
things.” These are all features that our analysis of deep mental absorption pre-
pared us to expect.
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Let me emphasize at this point that I have not extracted the predictions 
here considered from reports produced by those who have experienced deep 
absorption; they are rather a priori predictions of what such experiences can be 
like if indeed deep absorption is responsible for them, at least in part. Existing 
reports of such experiences—to the extent that they mention these features—
can therefore be taken to support this theory. And they answer in an affirma-
tive manner the question whether such states of deep mental absorption can 
exist. Yes, they can. But we will see that this does not answer all questions.
3 Mystical Experience and Mystical Thought
The features that we associate with deep absorption are not limited to situa-
tions in which someone has actually experienced a state of absorption of the 
necessary depth. The same or similar features appear in communications where 
there is no evidence for mystical experience whatsoever. This has prompted 
many scholars to unjustifiably postulate mystical experience in such cases. 
This is a frequent phenomenon, so that just one recent and particularly clear 
example must suffice. The Editor’s Introduction to The Cambridge Handbook of 
Western Mysticism and Esoterism (Magee 2016) claims that all that is typically 
categorized as “mystical” alludes to a life transforming and inexpressible expe-
rience of what it calls gnosis (p. xvi). The doctrines of mysticism, moreover, are 
an attempt to put the wordless into words, to communicate what is revealed 
in gnosis (p. xviii). The Editor’s Introduction then characterizes some common 
features in those doctrines, and states (p. xvii):
This doctrine is perhaps most starkly laid out in Vedanta, in the iden-
tity between Atman (one’s true self or nature) and Brahman (the tran-
scendent source of all being)—but the same teaching is to be found in 
Eckhart.
The authors of Vedanta and Meister Eckhart are given as illustrations of the 
attempt to express mystical experience into words. The Editor’s Introduction 
makes no attempt to show that these authors ever had such an experience, 
apart from stating that “in one way or another it alludes to such an experience”. 
Worse, Meister Eckhart, sometimes considered the founder of Rhineland 
mysticism, never claimed to have experienced anything of the kind (Hackett 
2013: xxii-xxv). He may not have been the only one. The chapter on medieval 
Christian mysticism of the Handbook observes (Milem 2016: 116):
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some of the writers who are usually acclaimed as mystics, such as Eckhart, 
Eriugena, and Cusanus, do not emphasize experiences or visions. Their 
mysticism consists in a particular way of thinking about God that tries to 
articulate how God is present in ordinary things and everyday experience. 
All three use a dialectical or paradoxical mode of speech that balances 
contrary descriptions of God against each other. Although God is identi-
cal with ordinary things, God is also absolutely transcendent and unlike 
them. Following their path of thinking may not lead to any special, peak 
mystical experiences, but it can infuse all things with a new significance 
as expressions or images of God.
The claim that the authors of Vedanta ever had an experience of this sort has 
nothing to support it.15
The Handbook does not only deal with mysticism. As its title indicates, it also 
concerns esotericism. Esotericism, too, we read in the Editor’s Introduction 
(Magee 2016: xxix), “is founded on gnosis, either directly (when esotericists 
themselves have the experience of gnosis) or indirectly (when esotericists put 
their faith in the testimony of those who have had the experience).” Indeed, 
everything treated in the Handbook as esotericism “—alchemy, astrology, 
magic, number symbolism, visions of other worlds, spiritualism, and so on—is 
founded in one way or another on the mystical teaching of hen kai pan (One 
and all), and everything that it entails” (p. xxix).
Claims like this put a heavy burden on the shoulders of those who have had 
“mystical experiences”. If it is true, important cultural traditions would not be 
there if mystics had not reported their experiences, or if people had not lis-
tened to them. Given this importance, one would think that it is vital to show 
that recognized mystics actually had, or had had, such experiences.
The Handbook is of not of much use in justifying such claims. The word 
experience does not even figure in the index, and experiences are not very 
often referred to. This does not mean that none of the individuals included 
had mystical experiences; there are cases where no doubt seems justified. It 
does however mean that it is advisable not to attribute such experiences too 
easily to individuals for the sole reason that they proclaim “mystical teachings”. 
If certain mystical teachings are widespread—and the Editor’s Introduction 
(p. xxxi n. 24) suggests that they are universal and cross-culturally valid—we 
may have to consider alternative explanations for their popularity. Such alter-
native explanations are still required even if we were to accept that mystical 
15   This does not exclude, of course, that there may have been individuals associated with 
Vedanta who had mystical experiences; an example would be Ramakrishna (see Sil 1991).
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experiences are their ultimate source (which we seriously doubt): for why 
should people “put their faith in the testimony of those who have had the ex-
perience”, as the Editor’s Introduction puts it? Why believe the claims of “real 
mystics” rather than the invented claims of “false mystics” or other charlatans? 
Unless there is a predisposition to accept certain views, the teachings of those 
who have had mystical experiences run the risk of not being valued and might 
soon be forgotten.16 But if there is such a predisposition, is there then still need 
for mystics to propound those views?
One of the contributors to the Handbook—Bruce Milem, author of chapter 10, 
on medieval Christian mysticism—presents a view that is rather different 
from the one espoused by its editor. His remarks are worth quoting (Milem 
2016: 107-108):
“Mysticism” is a modern designation that became widespread in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The first scholars of mysticism, 
such as William James, Evelyn Underhill, and Rudolf Otto, focused on 
what they called mystical or religious experience, which they thought 
was the root of all religion. This emphasis on experience is characteris-
tically modern, in harmony with doubts about tradition, authority, and 
institutions, and congruent with modernity’s confidence in the experien-
tial basis of science.
Milem then continues:
Because of the modern origins and character of the concept of “mys-
ticism”, we have to be careful when looking for mysticism in medieval 
Christianity. It is not that medieval people did not have, or were not inter-
ested in, extraordinary experiences of union with God. Rather, medieval 
people did not put the same weight on experience as an authority differ-
ent from tradition, Scripture, and church that modern people do. They 
expected these authorities to agree. Moreover, medieval thinkers typi-
cally put experiences of God within the context of the Christian’s gradual 
transformation into a perfected human being who enjoyed some sort 
of union or identity with God. This transformation, enacted in central 
16   This is not to deny that there are other factors that tempt people to accept certain beliefs, 
among these “cultural attractors”; see, e.g., Boudry & Braeckman 2012; Boudry, Blancke, 
& Pigliucci 2015. Unlike many of those other factors, which are by and large culturally 
determined, the features of “mystical thought” specified above are universal (even though 
their specific expressions will be colored by the ambient culture).
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Christian rituals such as baptism and communion, is what mattered, not 
the experiences. Still, some writers in the Middle Ages explored or em-
phasized the possibility that union with God is available in this life rather 
than exclusively in heaven … While some of these writers saw union as 
the basis for extraordinary experiences, others understood union as a 
permanent state of being that Christians would attain.
Seen this way, the belief in (or expectation of) union with God can hardly be 
the outcome of direct or indirect influence by mystics, and the presence of this 
“mystical” notion in medieval Christianity clamors for another explanation.
All this leaves us with a peculiar problem. If there can be mystical thought 
without mystical experience, we no longer need mystical experience to explain 
mystical thought.17 And yet, I consider it probable that there have been and 
are people who have mystical experiences and describe those experiences in 
terms that we also find in mystical thought. Who, then, influenced whom? Or 
is there no need to postulate influence?
It may not be easy to find a generally valid answer to this question. Assuming 
that Meister Eckhart did indeed not have mystical experiences, was he in-
fluenced by the writings or teachings of “real” mystics, i.e., mystics who had 
had them? If so, why did he consider those teachings significant? And why 
did his followers consider his teachings significant? We are confronted with 
the general question why mystical teachings appear significant to people who 
have not had mystical experiences themselves. Our line of enquiry takes us 
away from “real” mystics—those with mystical experiences—and toward the 
psychology of “ordinary” people, those who may draw inspiration from mysti-
cal teachings that may or may not derive from people who have had mystical 
experiences.18
It is time to return to our analysis of absorption. We saw that the assumed 
consequences of deep absorption made sense of many experiences reported 
by mystics and others. Many of the “ordinary” people who follow the teach-
ings of “real” mystics presumably never had such experiences. Remember at 
this point that the line separating deep absorption from less deep absorption 
17   It also further reduces the appeal of the claim that Indian philosophical theories arose 
from spiritual practice; see Franco 2018.
18   These observations may delight scholars who think that belief in “mystical thought” 
should be explained in terms of evolutionary psychology; see, e.g., Gorelik 2016; Gorelik & 
Shackelford 2017. However, even if it can be shown that “mystical thought” brings evolu-
tionary benefits (a question that this article does not address), this cannot be construed 
as a criticism of the mechanism that brings it about (such as the one proposed in this 
article). See further §§7 and 8, below.
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is not hard and fast. Many people can experience flow or become absorbed in 
contemplating art or listening to music. Is it possible that the limited degrees 
of absorption to which many people have access give them an intuitive aware-
ness that the world can be experienced differently?
This “solution” only shifts the problem. What does it mean that people have 
an intuitive awareness of mental states that they have not experienced? I pro-
pose the following answer: They have experienced such states, in early childhood. 
As a result, when people are confronted with so-called mystical teachings, they 
recognize elements. In a sense of remembering that will be specified below, they 
remember that they once experienced the world without a developed sense of 
self, that the world was once uninterpreted, or minimally interpreted.19 This is 
the thesis that will be further explored in what follows. But first more need be 
said about altered states of consciousness.
4 From Buddhism to Childhood
Little has been said so far about meditation. Yet certain forms of meditation 
deal with states of deep absorption. A look at some early Buddhist texts20 will 
suggest how to understand the processes involved.
The early Buddhist path contains a number of stages, two of which are of 
particular interest in the present context. A number of levels of deep absorp-
tion are part of it, but they are neither its beginning nor its end. These levels 
are preceded by preparatory practices, among which the practice of mindful-
ness is very important. There is no better way to compare and contrast the 
two—mindfulness and levels of absorption—than through a literal quotation 
of the most relevant passage from the early texts. Here we read (Bodhi 1995: 
274-275, modified):21
(1) He becomes one who acts in full awareness when going forward and 
returning; who acts in full awareness when looking ahead and looking 
away; who acts in full awareness when flexing and extending his limbs; 
who acts in full awareness when wearing his robes and carrying his outer 
19   The thesis here proposed should not be confounded with the idea of regression as pro-
pounded by Sigmund Freud and others (I thank Oliver Kress for reminding me of this).
20   The assumption that all or many Buddhists were accomplished meditators is certainly 
incorrect; see Appendix 2.
21   This translates Majjhima Nikaya I p. 181-182. This same passage occurs numerous times 
in the ancient Buddhist canon; see Schmithausen 1981: 204 n. 15. For details on early 
Buddhist teaching, see Bronkhorst 2009.
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robe and bowl; who acts in full awareness when eating, drinking, con-
suming food, and tasting, who acts in full awareness when defecating and 
urinating; who acts in full awareness when walking, standing, sitting, fall-
ing asleep, waking up, talking, and keeping silent.
…
(2) Having thus abandoned these five hindrances, imperfections of 
the mind that weaken wisdom, quite secluded from sensual pleasures, 
secluded from unwholesome states, he enters upon and abides in the first 
stage-of-meditation that is born of seclusion, which is accompanied by 
applied and sustained thought and consists of rapture and pleasure. […]
Again, with the stilling of applied and sustained thought, a monk en-
ters upon and abides in the second stage-of-meditation, which has self-
confidence and singleness of mind without applied and sustained thought, 
which is born of absorption and consists of rapture and pleasure. […]
Again, with the fading away as well of rapture, a monk abides in equa-
nimity, and mindful and fully aware, still feeling pleasure with the body, 
he enters upon and abides in the third stage-of-meditation, on account 
of which the noble ones announce: ‘He has a pleasant abiding who has 
equanimity and is mindful.’ […]
Again, with the abandoning of pleasure and pain, and with the previ-
ous disappearance of joy and grief, a monk enters upon and abides in 
the fourth stage-of-meditation, which has neither-pain-nor-pleasure and 
purity of mindfulness due to equanimity. […]
The first part of this passage (1) describes mindfulness, the second (2) the four 
stages-of-meditation.
I have elsewhere interpreted this passage in the light of a theory that dis-
tinguishes, and contrasts, the implicit and the explicit systems of mental 
functioning (Bronkhorst forthcoming). “The explicit system is a sophisticated 
system that is tied to consciousness and thus capable of representing knowl-
edge in a higher-order format. In contrast, the implicit system is inaccessible 
to consciousness.” (Dietrich & Haider 2017: 3-4). The implicit system is respon-
sible for automatic behavior and activities that are not in need of conscious 
supervision and may even resist it. Mindfulness, as can be learnt from the first 
part of the above quotation, aims at expanding the realm of the explicit system 
and reducing the realm of the implicit system. This, in turn, facilitates greater 
depth of absorption.22
22   The assumption that the realms of the explicit and implicit systems are variable finds 
support in the finding that anxiety and cognitive load (which presumably put a greater 
demand on the implicit system) reduce attention control; Shi et al. 2019.
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The Buddhist text here cited distinguishes between two kind of mental 
practice: mindfulness and absorption. The two are not unrelated, because 
mindfulness is presented as preparatory to absorption but is still present in 
the deepest stages-of-meditation. And yet, they lead to distinguishable mental 
states. While mindfulness attempts to open up an awareness that is as broad as 
possible, absorption unites it to a maximum degree. It appears that the greater 
openness created by mindfulness allows greater unification, in the form of ab-
sorption, of the extra “space” that mindfulness provides. The process may even 
be bidirectional: deep absorption penetrates into the realm of the implicit sys-
tem and thus creates space for greater mindfulness. The mutual interplay of 
the two facilitates the attainment of deeper states.23
For our present purposes it is useful to distinguish between the mental 
states resulting from mindfulness and absorption respectively. This distinction 
will help us understand the state of awareness of young children, to which we 
now turn.
How do children experience the world? Recent work by Alison Gopnik, a 
psychologist, may provide an answer. Gopnik compares the external con-
sciousness of adults to a spotlight and contrasts this with attention in children, 
which is more like a lantern (Gopnik 2009: 124):
It’s plausible that babies are actually aware of much more, much more 
intensely, than we are. The attentional spotlight in adults seems more like 
an attentional lantern for babies. Instead of experiencing a single aspect 
of their world and shutting down everything else they seem to be vividly 
experiencing everything at once….
Babies also seem less subject to certain kinds of unconsciousness than 
we are. Less of their experience is familiar, expert, and automatic, and 
so they have fewer habituated unconscious behaviors. While they inhibit 
distractions less well, more of the field of consciousness will be available 
to them.
Translated in terms of the notions of an explicit and an implicit system of men-
tal functioning here adopted, this becomes: In relative terms, the realm of the 
explicit system is larger in babies than in us, the realm of the implicit system is 
smaller. The mental state that adults can only reach through a combination of 
mindfulness and absorption is freely available to infants.
23   It is not impossible that mindfulness and absorption vaguely correspond to meditation 
and contemplation in some of the senses in which the latter terms were used in Western 
European Christianity; see Baier 2019.
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Consciousness, Gopnik maintains, narrows down as a function of age: “As 
adults, when we pay attention, we are regressing a little part of our brain to its 
childhood state. We are taking a little part of us and turning that into a 2-year-
old again.”24 This quotation confirms what I suggested earlier, viz., that atten-
tion penetrates into the realm of the implicit system and thus creates space for 
greater mindfulness, i.e. baby consciousness (see below).
In order to clarify what the child’s consciousness is like, Gopnik makes a 
comparison with different kinds of meditation (Gopnik 2009: 127):
Meditative practices involve manipulating attention in novel ways. In 
some of these traditions, the idea is to focus and sustain vivid attention 
on a single object—a mandala or a koan or a crucifix. But in other types 
of meditation the idea is to distribute attention as much as possible. 
Certain types of “open awareness” meditative practices are about not fo-
cusing on a single object.
This second type of meditation is “like the lantern consciousness of child-
hood as opposed to the spotlight consciousness of ordinary adult attention”. 
Gopnik argues “that this expansive lantern consciousness is almost the oppo-
site of the distinctive adult happiness that comes with what psychologists call 
‘flow’”. (Gopnik 2009: 129). Our discussion so far suggests that this distinction 
corresponds to the distinction between mindfulness and deep absorption. 
Children’s consciousness corresponds to the state that mindfulness practice 
seeks to attain: expansion of the realm of the explicit system at the expense 
of the realm of the implicit system. Unlike adults, young children need make 
no effort to get there; they are there already. This explains that babies seem less 
subject to certain kinds of unconsciousness than we are, that less of their expe-
rience is familiar, expert, and automatic, and that they have fewer habituated 
unconscious behaviors, as claimed by Gopnik in the above quotation. It also 
explains that more of the field of consciousness will be available to them.
Regarding the self of young children, I will one more time quote Gopnik 
(2009: 146):
you could say that babies and young children have episodic memory but 
not autobiographical memory. Although they are very good at remem-
bering specific events in the past, they don’t put these events into a single 
coherent timeline, don’t remember how they know about the events, and 
don’t remember their past attitudes toward events…. And they don’t have 
24   Gopnik, as quoted in Ananthaswamy 2014; see further Sweeny et al. 2015.
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a single “inner autobiographer”, a self who links their past and present 
mental states.
Steven Rose (2003: 41) adds that “many childhood memories … are not linear, 
not a series of sequential events, but more like pictures, truly ‘photographic’ 
memories, even if the photographs come with feels, sounds and smells 
attached.” He calls such memories “eidetic” memories (p. 118), recollected as 
a series of snapshots, fixed or frozen in time.
It appears, then, that adults preserve memories from their childhood, but 
that such memories may not be sequentially ordered, and may not even be 
linked to their sense of self. Remember: “without a sense of self, memories 
have no meaning” (quoted above); this means: they may be remembered but 
are not necessarily connected with our sense of self. The question now is: can 
there be memories of the way the world was experienced in childhood? Does 
Gopnik’s lantern consciousness leave traces that can be recollected, one way 
or another, by adults?25
I am not aware of research that might give a definite answer to this 
question.26 However, Gopnik compares the experience of babies to the adult 
experience of travel—preferably to exotic places—, to certain types of medita-
tion, to “other kinds of activities, such as falling in love, hunting, or even mania”. 
“Lantern consciousness is invoked by writers like Virginia Woolf and Emily 
Dickinson and artists like Henri Cartier-Bresson.” (Gopnik 2009: ch. 4). To this 
list she adds psychedelic drugs (Ananthaswamy 2014). All of these experiences 
of lantern consciousness, when undergone by adults, leave memories, includ-
ing memories of the states of awareness in which they were experienced; they 
are even eminently memorable. It seems safe to conclude that also the lantern 
consciousness of children can in principle be remembered. However, like Rose’s 
eidetic memories, these impressions may not be part of the autobiographical 
past that the child will develop in time. The child’s lantern consciousness may 
remain present, frozen in time, as a kind of background awareness that accom-
panies the adult throughout their life.
25   Note that this kind of recollection has nothing to do with remembering facts, people, 
things, relationships, and places, which undergoes infantile amnesia (see, e.g., Alberini & 
Travaglia 2017). It is part of the theory here presented that memory of the state of aware-
ness does not undergo infantile amnesia.
26   It is not immediately obvious what shape such research could take. Memory of states 
of awareness does not easily qualify as either “episodic memory” or “semantic memory”. 
I tentatively make the (self-contradictory?) proposal that it is episodic memory without 
autonoesis (see Tulving 2001; LeDoux 2019: 296 f.).
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5 Expressions of an Intuition: Practices
We have come to the provisional conclusion that human beings, presumably 
all of them,27 have an intuitive awareness of a state of being very different from 
what we are used to in daily life. This intuitive awareness is at bottom the non-
sequential memory of a state of awareness that we experienced in early child-
hood; this non-sequential memory does not contribute to our sense of adult 
identity. Many religious behaviors and beliefs (as well as other behaviors and 
beliefs) can be understood as resulting from attempts to recover this different 
state of being, often through the cultivation of mindfulness and absorption. 
Instances are the following.
Consider prayer. Recent research on prayer as observed in certain Christian 
churches reveals that there can be more or less skillful pray-ers (i.e., people 
who pray), that at least some forms of prayer involve skills that can be prac-
ticed and developed, and that this skill is absorption. Prayer may allow pray-ers 
to reach various degrees of mental absorption (Luhrmann 2005; Luhrmann, 
Nusbaum & Thisted 2010: 75). In prayer, “when people believe that God will 
speak to them through their senses, when they have a proclivity for absorption, 
and when they are trained in absorption by the practice of prayer, these peo-
ple will report internal sensory experiences with sharper mental-imagery and 
more sensory overrides”. (Luhrmann, Nusbaum & Thisted 2010: 74). Indeed, “a 
habit of kataphatic prayer28 leads people to report more sensory experiences 
about God than people listening to lectures on the Gospels … And that is why 
inner sense cultivation is important to religion. The great goal of daily practice 
in an evangelical church in which God speaks back is to teach people to blur 
the line that the human mind draws between the internal and the external …” 
“Inner sense cultivation … seems to contribute to intense spiritual experience 
of God”. (Luhrmann & Morgain 2012: 382). Researchers have noticed some cog-
nitive effects: “[A] form of prayer practice which uses mental imagery in many 
sensory modalities, visual above all, increases imagery vividness and (to some 
extent) alters perceptual accuracy … Our data have shown that these practices 
lead to reports of unusual sensory experiences and to reports of unusual sen-
sory experiences associated with the religious ideas which form the content of 
the practice.” (Luhrmann, Nusbaum & Thisted 2013: 171-172).
27   It would be interesting if people were found who do not have this intuition, presumably 
because they do not “remember” the state of awareness of early childhood. This issue is 
briefly discussed in §7, below.
28   Kataphatic, or affirmative, prayer is to be distinguished from apophatic prayer, in which 
practitioners disattend to thought and mental imagery (Luhrmann & Morgain 2012: 362).
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Love and devotion are common means to promote mindfulness and absorp-
tion, not only in Christian prayer, but also in the Hindu practice of bhakti, Sufi 
practices in Islam, and elsewhere.29
Ritualized actions, a recent study points out, are “more attention grabbing 
and more memorable than non-ritualized actions”. Certain aspects of ritual 
“allow for greater allocation of attentional resources”. Indeed, “sensorimotor 
processing of the controlled segmented ritual actions leads to biased attention”. 
“During the performance of a ritual, focusing on the series of action se-
quences will direct a person’s attention to the specific motions and sensory 
experiences”. “[R]ituals can regulate goal-directed behavior … by heightening 
attention to the goal context through the experience of segmented, repetitive 
actions”. Rituals may be particularly good at directing attention “because they 
are inherently compelling and attention grabbing”. “[A]dherence to ritual ac-
tions limits attention to particular stimuli in the environment”; “focused at-
tention swamps a person’s executive systems, leaving little room for personal 
improvisation or alteration” (Hobson et al. 2018: 263, 265, 268, 273). An earlier 
study had already stated (Boyer & Liénard 2006: 606):
… ritualized acts are very different from other routines. However often an 
individual may perform a ritualized action, it does not seem to become 
automatic. On the contrary, it remains constrained by high-level cogni-
tive control. Ritualized actions … require high cognitive control because 
the rules often apply to familiar actions (e.g., walking, talking, preparing 
food) and turn them into more difficult task (e.g., walking without tread-
ing on the line). This clashes with a commonsense notion that rituals 
only include actions that one performs “routinely” or “without thinking”. 
Indeed, … the components of rituals that we called Ritualized Behavior 
cannot be automatic.
It appears from these quotations that ritual can combine the two practices 
that correspond to mindfulness and absorption respectively. More than prayer, 
ritual behavior requires the practitioner to be aware of every single act he or 
she performs (Ritualized Behavior cannot be automatic).
It is known to the psychology of ritual that the performance of ritual can 
have a positive emotional effect on its participants. This effect, it is claimed, 
may be a direct consequence of the mental states in which ritual activities are 
carried out (Hobson et al. 2018: 265):
29   See, e.g., Hardy 1983/2014; Schimmel 1975.
20 10.1163/15700682-12341504 | Bronkhorst
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion  (2020) 1-41
One mechanism by which performing rituals may regulate emotion 
is that the act of performance may direct attention away from one’s 
emotions. During the performance of a ritual, focusing on the series of 
action sequences will direct a person’s attention to the specific motions 
and sensory experiences. Rituals then can serve as a form of distraction, 
blocking out possible negative thoughts from entering a person’s mind. 
In line with this thinking, Boyer and Liénard (2006) propose that the 
physical action units of ritual lead to a swamping of working memory 
that temporarily reduces anxiety. This attentional demand minimizes 
anxiety by blocking intrusive thoughts …
Limited perceptual and cognitive effects have also been observed, but these 
have not so far been connected with absorption (Nielbo & Sørensen 2016, 
esp. p. 319).
There is no reason to disagree with these findings, for they do not contradict 
the perspective here adopted. Rituals may have these effects, while at the same 
time being (only partially successful) attempts to recover the different state of 
consciousness that characterizes early childhood.
Also, religious asceticism can be viewed as an attempt to recover this state 
of consciousness, but this time mindfulness and absorption play no interme-
diate role. We saw that in states of deep absorption people do not identify 
with their activities. The tendency to not identify with one’s actions, and with 
one’s body and mind in general, is a recurring theme in asceticism. Often it 
takes the form of physical and mental immobility. This is most strikingly il-
lustrated by the Indian ascetics who remained motionless for great lengths of 
time, as it is by the Christian ascetics who did the same (think of the stylites). 
Refusal to identify with the body also finds expression in the sufferings of 
the Christian martyrs, elaborately documented in the relevant literature. 
Puberty initiations in many tribal societies expect the initiands to suffer se-
vere pain with equanimity.30 Note that in these cases an implicit belief regard-
ing the nature of one’s self is the intermediary that supposedly connects with 
the state of consciousness looked for. In some cases (such as Brahmanical 
thought, in India) an explicit belief of the nature of the self takes its place 
(see below; §6).
30   Bronkhorst 2001a contains many examples (note that I have meanwhile somewhat modi-
fied my theoretical take on it). The refusal to identify with one’s actions is also found in 
Sufism (Schimmel 1975: passim, e.g. p. 196).
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6 Expressions of an Intuition: Beliefs
We have seen that so-called mystical thought does not necessarily depend on 
mystical experience: all human beings share an “intuition” that draws them to-
ward “mystical thought”. That intuition can be explained, I argue, in terms of an 
implicit, non-specific, memory (though not memory in the ordinary sense of 
the word) of the mental state we were in as babies. This state—without sense 
of self, without a narrative that connects the present with past and future, 
without language, and without the advanced interpretation of sense impres-
sions that adults apply to them—is only accessible to adults through devices 
such as mental absorption. Young children have access to it without the help of 
such devices. Intuition draws adults to such states and inclines them to adopt 
beliefs and practices that are “felt” to connect with them.
The most striking of these beliefs is the shared conviction that there is a 
reality different from “ordinary” reality. It is part of most if not all religions, 
and even non-religious persons may be tempted to believe that “there must be 
more”. It is not confined to those who have had mystical experiences and is not 
normally looked upon as “mystical”. This conviction of a different reality is yet 
remarkable and demands an explanation. The theory here proposed provides 
such an explanation.
Only slightly less widespread is the belief that this transcendent reality is 
inhabited by one or more conscious beings: God, or gods. It has been observed 
that the “only feature of humans that is always projected onto supernatural be-
ings is the mind”. (Boyer 2001: 144; see further Westh 2013). This is not surpris-
ing in the light of our theory, which looks upon the belief in a transcendental 
reality as ultimately based on the intuitive awareness of the way we experi-
enced the world in childhood.31 There was always a conscious presence in that 
experience, a presence that would in due time develop into the notion of self, 
but had not yet done so at that time. Unsurprisingly, the proximity or even 
identity of self and God is a recurring theme in many religions. Note however 
that memories from early childhood do not necessarily predispose to a belief 
in God, which is after all not part of the child’s awareness. This leaves open the 
question whether Tarzan would believe in God (Banerjee & Bloom 2013).32 The 
31   It is certainly no coincidence that the tendency to rely on intuition (rather than on reflec-
tion) positively influences one’s tendency to believe in God and related things; Shenhav, 
Rand & Greene 2011; Pennycook et al. 2012.
32   Indeed, belief in god(s) is not universal in hunter-gatherer societies, and may not have 
been present in the last common ancestor (LCA) of present-day hunter-gatherers: 
“Reconstructions are equivocal on whether or not the religion of the LCA of present-day 
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theories developed in the cognitive science of religion account for such beliefs 
(see various chapters in Slone & McCorkle 2019); our theory finds a place for 
such entities in transcendental (rather than ordinary) reality.
Many commonly held beliefs go further than this.33 A set of beliefs that has 
attracted much attention is the so-called perennial philosophy. Perhaps the 
best-known representative of this “philosophy” is Aldous Huxley, whose book 
The Perennial Philosophy first came out in 1944.
What is this perennial philosophy? This is what Huxley says about it 
(Huxley 1947: 1):
Philosophia perennis—the phrase was coined by Leibniz;34 but the 
thing—the metaphysic that recognizes a divine Reality substantial to 
the world of things and lives and minds; the psychology that finds in the 
soul something similar to, or even identical with, divine Reality; the ethic 
that places man’s final end in the knowledge of the immanent and tran-
scendent Ground of all being—the thing is immemorial and universal. 
Rudiments of the Perennial Philosophy may be found among the tradi-
tionary lore of primitive peoples in every region of the world, and in its 
fully developed forms it has a place in every one of the higher religions.
Shear (1994: 319-320) specifies the “core” of the perennial philosophy in a man-
ner that lays less emphasis on the “divine”:
(1) The phenomenal world is the manifestation of a transcendental 
ground; (2) human beings are capable of attaining immediate knowledge 
of that ground; (3) in addition to their phenomenal egos, human beings 
possess a transcendental Self which is of the same or like nature with 
that transcendental ground; and (4) this identification is life’s chief end 
or purpose.
It is easy to recognize in these summaries two of the features (transcenden-
tal reality; transcendental self) that we associated with deep absorption. This 
hunter-gatherers included belief in an afterlife, shamanism, ancestor worship, and the 
concept of a single creator deity, or a high god. Belief in either ancestral spirits or creator 
deities who remain active in human affairs was not present in ancestral hunter-gatherer 
societies, according to the reconstructions.” (Peoples, Duda & Marlow 2016: 277).
33   It is to be kept in mind that no attempt will be made to identify or enumerate all the fac-
tors that played a role in shaping the following examples. All that counts in the present 
context is that they illustrate the features of “mystical thought” identified above.
34   This is not correct: it was coined by Agostino Steuco in 1540; see Bronkhorst 2001: 175 n. 1.
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does not mean that the perennial philosophy is true (as many have claimed), 
nor that the perennial philosophy is based on mystical experience (as others 
have claimed). It merely confirms our thesis that human beings have intuitions 
that predispose them to hold such views. This predisposition, we now think, is 
based on the background presence in the mind of experience that we all had 
in childhood.
This predisposition finds expression in other ways as well. Recall that the 
“real” self does not participate in the activities of body and mind.35 It is often 
conceived of as being non-active by nature; and in religious movements where 
the transcendental self is believed to be identical with divine reality, this divine 
reality, too, is thought of as non-active. Here are some examples (Huxley 1947: 
52, 45, 117, 145, 146, 22, 44, 93): Ruysbroeck attributes inaction to the Godhead in 
the following passages: “There is a distinction and differentiation, according to 
our reason, between God and the Godhead, between action and rest. The fruit-
ful nature of the Persons ever worketh in a living differentiation. But the simple 
Being of God, according to the nature thereof, is an eternal Rest of God and of all 
created things.” And again: “(In the Reality unitively known by the mystic), we 
can speak no more of Father, Son and Holy Spirit, nor of any creature, but only 
one Being, which is the very substance of the Divine Persons. There were we 
all one before our creation, for this is our super-essence. There the Godhead is 
in simple essence without activity.” Eckhart said: “For in thus breaking through, I 
perceive what God and I are in common. There I am what I was. There I neither 
increase nor decrease. For there I am the immovable which moves all things.” 
And again: “The damned are in eternal movement without any mixture of rest; 
we mortals, who are yet in this pilgrimage, have now movement, now rest…. 
Only God has repose without movement.” Albertus Magnus stated: “… Work to 
simplify the heart, that being immovable and at peace from any invading vain 
phantasms, thou mayest always stand fast in the Lord within thee, to that de-
gree as if thy soul had already entered the always present now of eternity—
that is, the state of deity….”. And again: “[he] becomes immutable and arrives at 
that true life which is God Himself”.
The idea that the self is by its nature inactive is widespread in Indian thought. 
And those currents that identify the self with Brahman (primarily Vedanta), at-
tribute inactivity to Brahman as well (e.g., Bronkhorst 2007: passim).
It is easy to add quotations from a variety of religions concerning the in-
active nature of God, or of the soul, or of both; there is no need to do so at 
35   On a less “deep” level, it appears “that people show a general tendency to conclude that 
deep inside every individual, there is a ‘true self ’ motivating him or her to behave in ways 
that are virtuous” (Newman, Bloom & Knobe 2014).
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present (many examples have been collected in Bronkhorst 2001a). I will how-
ever draw attention to some particularly important movements. One of these 
is Gnosticism as it is depicted in the collection of Gnostic gospels discovered 
at Nag Hammadi, in Egypt (Robinson 1984). God, and the human soul which 
is essentially identical with it, are here so often referred to as immovable, im-
mutable, and the like, that those who possess the gnosis are called “the im-
movable race” (Williams 1985). The theme of inaction as we find it in India is 
particularly interesting, because its various manifestations are here embedded 
in a wider theory, the doctrine of karma (e.g., Bronkhorst 1993; 2011). Karma 
means action, and the doctrine of karma implies that our past actions are re-
sponsible for our present state, while our present actions determine our future 
state. The force of our actions continues, in this way, the cycle of repeated re-
births to which we are subjected. Breaking out of this cycle is only possible 
by abstaining from further activities, and this is what many Indian ascetics, 
including Jainas, try to do by practicing immobility. Others believe there is a 
different way to break the beginningless chain of actions and their results. It 
consists in the realization that one’s true self, one’s soul, is by nature inactive. 
Once a person fully realizes that his true self has nothing whatsoever to do 
with the activities of their body and mind, the effects of those activities will 
not affect them anymore, and they will be liberated. Confronted with the ques-
tion how, then, their body should act, texts like the Bhagavadgita add that one 
should leave the body to perform the activities prescribed by one’s station in 
life, meanwhile making sure that one does not get involved in these actions.
The theme of inaction is not limited to the nature of the self. Scholars have 
commented upon the remarkable fact that many tribal societies recognize the 
existence of a Supreme Being. A noteworthy feature of this Supreme Being in 
many of its manifestations is its remote and inactive nature (Sullivan 1987).36
36   Different researchers propose different answers to the question whether an inactive high 
god was already part of religion in the remote past. Peoples, Duda & Marlowe (2016), 
drawing conclusions from a study of present-day hunter-gatherers about their last com-
mon ancestor, observe (p. 272): “The equivocal results based on maximum likelihood and 
absence according to maximum parsimony for the ancestral state of ‘high gods’ suggests 
possible presence of belief in a single creator deity among ancestral hunter-gatherers, 
albeit one that is not active in human affairs …”. Witzel (2012), who draws conclusions 
about the remote past from a comparative study of mythologies, states (p. 360-361): “the 
Gondwana High God is a deus otiosus who has retreated into heaven and is little occupied 
with humans and therefore is hardly venerated”; “neither the Gondwana High God, nor 
the Eurasian (Father) Heaven, nor the Amerindian Great Spirit is a creator god: they do 
not create the universe or the world, and they leave its establishment to later demiurge 
deities”; “For the Laurasian case we may … conclude that the original Pan-Gaean motif of 
the High God was copied into Laurasian mythology but was reshaped as (Father) Heaven 
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The notion of a self that is not involved in the activities of body and mind 
expresses itself altogether differently in beliefs that are present in many tribal 
societies (e.g., Hultkrantz 1994). Human beings have here several “souls”; one 
of these souls, which researchers variously refer to as “free-soul” or “dream-
ego” or the like, is characterized by the feature of not participating in bodily 
actions. Often it only has a role to play in situations where the body is motion-
less: in sleep, trance or unconsciousness (see the surveys by Hultkrantz [1953], 
Fischer [1965], Hochegger [1965], Paulson [1958]). This particular soul, accord-
ing to certain researchers, is the principle of life and of consciousness, and the 
precondition for thought, feeling and will (Fischer 1965: 321, 324).
7 Evidence
The preceding sections present a theory. What evidence is it based on? Are 
there ways to test it? Could there be evidence that refutes it?
The theory contains two hypotheses that are used to explain two kinds of 
phenomena.
The first hypothesis—about the link between absorption and mystical 
experience—accounts for a number of features that characterize many mysti-
cal experiences: access to a different reality, different sense of time, different 
sense of self, ineffability. The frequent occurrence of these features in mys-
tical experience is not open to doubt. One could however wonder whether 
they can be explained differently, with the help of a different hypothesis. 
The possibility of one or more different explanatory hypotheses cannot be 
discarded—neither here nor in any other area of science. In science, compet-
ing hypotheses can often be compared or even confronted, thus allowing the 
researcher to choose the one that most satisfactorily accounts for the phenom-
ena concerned. Unfortunately, most relevant hypotheses that I am aware of try 
to explain religious behaviors and beliefs in evolutionary terms, which means 
that this or that religious practice or belief presumably increases evolutionary 
fitness. We will see below (§8) that in the theory here presented the religious 
predisposition is a by-product of other characteristics whose contribution to 
evolutionary fitness is not in doubt. This means that the survival value of re-
sulting behaviors and beliefs, even if it is there, is no more than a bonus that 
can at best play a subsidiary role in explaining those behaviors and beliefs. 
and repositioned to the second age, after initial creation (or ‘emergence’)”. (Gondwana 
and Laurasia are technical terms introduced by Witzel to refer to different categories of 
myths that are historically linked to different geographical regions.).
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In short, those alternative explanatory hypotheses are not in conflict with the 
one here presented; they are not competing hypotheses. Without competing 
hypotheses, there is nothing to compare.
Statistical testing of the hypothesis might be conceivable if one could com-
pare depth of absorption with frequency of experiential features. At present 
no such testing seems possible, the main reason being that no objective scale 
measuring depth of absorption—by which I mean: based on neurophysiologi-
cal measurements—is available (see note 13, above). (I consider developing 
such a scale a desideratum.)
The second hypothesis—regarding the memory (though not remembered 
memory) that we preserve of the manner in which young children experience 
the world—explains the curious phenomenon that the features mentioned 
above often appear in the discourse and behavior of people who have not had 
mystical experiences. As curious as it is, this phenomenon has not so far at-
tracted scholarly attention. The explanation here proposed, our second hy-
pothesis, is necessarily tentative. It is based on recent developments in child 
psychology, which have not yet stood the test of time. On the other hand, it 
provides a simple explanation of a most remarkable phenomenon that may be 
a cornerstone of religious behavior and belief.
Might this phenomenon be explained by alternative hypotheses? As in all 
other branches of science, there is no way to rule this out. However, to the best 
of my knowledge no such alternatives are available, for the simple reason that 
the present article focuses on features that have not attracted scholarly atten-
tion so far.
One could imagine that the second hypothesis could be tested in individu-
als whose childhood memory of states of awareness is deficient.37 What would 
their “spiritual” life look like? Would they be free from the tendency to believe 
in a higher reality? Questions like these are premature, because it has not even 
been established as yet that anyone has memories from earliest childhood 
that preserve the manner in which the child experienced the world. This, as I 
pointed out in §4, is an issue clarity about which would be most welcome.
It is possible (though perhaps not likely) that future research in child psy-
chology will show that young children do not experience the world in the 
manner described by Gopnik and her colleagues. It is also conceivable that 
research will demonstrate that these early forms of experience leave no traces, 
in which case they cannot affect adults. If so, our second hypothesis will have 
to be modified or abandoned.
37   Ordinary childhood amnesia concerns contents, not states of awareness. The two should 
not be confused.
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The two hypotheses combined maintain (i) that human beings try to re-
establish mental states they had in early childhood, and (ii) that they do so 
by means of practices and beliefs in which mental absorption plays a central 
role. The theory is of course preliminary, but this cannot be held against it, 
for all scientific results are preliminary, open to future improvements—or 
rejection.38 What counts in its favor is that it makes coherent sense of many be-
haviors and beliefs (many of which commonly considered religious). Another 
point in its favor, I would like to add, is its elegance: it does not need, or presup-
pose, complicated structures, nor does it postulate unspecified mutations in 
the genome related to this or that behavior or belief.
8 Conclusion
At the end of his book Mysticism and Philosophy, W. T. Stace (1960: 343) dis-
cussed the claim “that mysticism is ultimately the source and essence of all 
religion”. He rejected this claim for the following reason: “We shall have to 
maintain that mystical consciousness is latent in all men but is in most men 
submerged below the surface of consciousness…. its influences appear [in 
the upper consciousness] in the form of religious impulses. And these in turn 
will give rise to the intellectual impulses which are the various creeds.” Stace 
thought that “difficulties this kind of view has to meet, … though perhaps not 
insuperable, are very great”.
We have come to a position that is close to the one that Stace considered 
beset with “very great difficulties”. We agree with him that mysticism is not 
“ultimately the source and essence of all religion”, certainly not in any straight-
forward manner. But our reflections do justify the belief that something like 
mystical consciousness is latently present in all of us “below the surface of 
consciousness”; or rather: in our memory. Indeed, this so-called mystical 
consciousness is the way we experienced the world and ourselves in early 
childhood. We do not remember this awareness the way we remember things 
in later childhood and as adults. But it is remembered none-the-less, in a non-
sequential and to some extent impersonal manner, which explains that we 
“recognize” experiences and ideas that take us closer to it. And these are the 
experiences and ideas that frequently become part of religion in its multiple 
manifestations.
38   “Rather than closing down a question, publication is intended to be a red flag to bullish 
colleagues” (Cox & Cohen 2017: 23).
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Let it be clear that this latent mystical consciousness is not “ultimately the 
source and essence of all religion” either. Yes, it accounts for many features that 
find expression in numerous religions, but it does not account for countless 
other features. Not even the belief in God or gods is fully accounted for, as we 
have seen. However, the theory here proposed may be thought of as a coat rack 
that may be particularly well suited to provide place for such beliefs.
One important question remains. It may be true that certain religious be-
haviors and beliefs bring evolutionary benefits, the evolutionary benefits of 
certain other religious behaviors and beliefs are far from evident, and some 
of them are clearly “counter-reproductive”. Indeed, “[f]rom an evolutionary 
standpoint, it’s odd that natural selection wouldn’t have forestalled the emer-
gence of such an expensive ensemble of brain and body behaviors” (Atran 
2002: 264). Odd it may be, but some harmful religious practices (harmful from 
an evolutionary point of view, such as initiations that physically harm the 
initiands) may have been around long enough to raise the question why they 
have not been selected away (e.g., Owens & Hayden 1997; McCauley, Maxwell 
& Collard 2018). Can we seriously maintain that we have an inherited predis-
position to ritual, for example?39 If not, how then do we account for these and 
other religious practices and beliefs?
The position here taken is that we are not genetically programmed to engage 
in religious practices or to accept religious beliefs. These are rather by-products 
of certain other features: the capacity to concentrate and the acquisition of 
language. We would not survive without the faculty of concentration or at-
tention, yet it is this faculty that points the way toward a state of awareness 
to which we have no longer access as adults, but which we “remember”. The 
evolutionary significance of language cannot be doubted. The acquisition of 
language creates an extensive web of associations that separates infantile from 
adult awareness.40 Deep absorption is the means accessible to some of us to 
pierce through this web. The combination of these two—the faculty of con-
centration and the acquisition of language—made us susceptible to religious 
practices and beliefs, in the manner explained above.
Absence of language explains that animals different from humans have no 
communicable religious beliefs (to the best of our knowledge), but not just 
that. This same absence may also explain that animals do not appear to engage 
in religious practices. This conclusion has to be tentative for the time being, 
39   So, e.g., Michaels 2016: 284: “As rituals are found everywhere and in every society, one 
must indeed assume an inherited predisposition to ritual—an ability that seeks culturally 
varying forms of expression.”
40   For a detailed study of this web, see Bronkhorst 2010 / 2012a.
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especially since Jane Goodall understands certain chimpanzee dances as hav-
ing spiritual significance (see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jjQCZClpaaY; 
further Kühl et al. 2016; Schaefer 2015). Her suggestion is not in conflict with 
the theory here presented, but it is highly unlikely that religious practices (if 
at all present) will play a role of much significance in animals that do not use 
language.
9 Questions that Remain
The preceding pages have shown that there are reasons to think that many 
religious practices and beliefs (and no doubt many other practices and beliefs) 
find an explanation in the assumption that human beings (often unknowingly) 
attempt to recover a state of awareness that belongs to their early childhood. 
This, however, raises new questions. The present section will formulate some 
of these, without making claims as to how they should be answered. At best, 
it will share some speculative thoughts that must be taken for what they 
are worth.
Why should people make attempts to recover an earlier state of awareness? 
What is behind this drive that ultimately finds expression in religious practices 
and beliefs (and no doubt elsewhere)? Preceding sections introduced the no-
tion of intuition and explained what we mean by it. We intuit that there is a 
“higher” reality behind our everyday world, and we intuit that certain activities 
get us closer to that reality. But why would we want to know that reality, and 
why would we want to get closer to it? These questions have not so far been 
addressed.
We can be brief about religious beliefs. It is not surprising that people show 
a preference for beliefs that somehow “feel” more real than beliefs that do not 
evoke this feeling.41 We saw that states of deep absorption feel more real than 
ordinary awareness for a simple reason: they are less interpreted. This feel-
ing apparently accompanies, even in ordinary states of mind, beliefs that are 
somehow related to the intuited memory of the state of young children.
This does not yet explain the tendency to engage in religious practices. What 
is the motivation behind these? Why should people make attempts to recover 
the state of consciousness of early childhood?
41   There is a discussion around the question to what extent people really believe reli-
gious beliefs; see Boudry & Coyne 2016, contra Van Leeuwen 2014; further Boyer 2013; 
Bronkhorst 2016.
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There may be different answers for different practices. We have seen that 
those who experience states of deep absorption tend to consider those states 
as somehow more real, or as opening up a reality that is “higher”, more “real”, 
than ordinary reality. Ritual, by deepening the level of absorption, provides 
access, if ever so limited, to that higher reality. It is not infrequently used to 
anchor ordinary human transactions into that higher reality, presumably mak-
ing them irreversible. The wedding ritual goes in this way beyond the prom-
ises that are exchanged; being grounded in that higher reality, these promises 
cannot easily be broken. Numerous other rituals serve a similar purpose: they 
“sanctify” human transactions or relations in a manner that makes them ir-
reversible. Sacrifices, for example, may give a transcendent dimension to re-
lationships of inferiority and superiority. When we take this “practical” side of 
rituals into consideration, the urge to perform them looks less mysterious.42
However, no such “practical” side is obvious in the case of asceticism and 
martyrdom (unless, of course, one takes literally the belief systems in which 
they are integrated). We saw that the implicit notion of self that inspires many 
forms of asceticism—the conviction that one is different from one’s body and 
one’s actions—brings back the awareness of early childhood in which there is 
no developed sense of self. This does not however explain why certain people 
seek to confront the consequences of this notion in situations of often self-
inflicted or solicited pains and tortures.43
This issue cannot be dealt with without discussing a question that I have so 
far carefully avoided. States of deep absorption are frequently accompanied by 
feelings of bliss, even ecstasy. How does that fit in?
I am not sure why deep absorption should give rise to intense pleasure.44 
However, there is one factor that clearly plays a role. Deep absorption goes 
hand in hand with deep relaxation. This is even true of less deep forms of ab-
sorption, such as hypnotic trance and flow, even prayer.45 This fits in well into 
the theory here presented. We saw that deep absorption requires an extension 
of the realm of the explicit system of mental functioning at the expense of 
the implicit system. The implicit system is responsible for the activities and 
42   This issue has been dealt with at length in Bronkhorst 2012.
43   It may however make such people susceptible to psychological manipulation; cf. Pinker 
2012: §2.
44   It is possible that the focusing aspect of absorption, here ignored (see note 3, above), plays 
a role.
45   For hypnosis, see Edmonston 1979: 455: “That neutral hypnosis and relaxation are equated 
is not an artifact of history, but a statement of a persistent finding in the data.” For prayer, 
see Elkins, Anchor & Sandler 1979.
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behaviors that take place without conscious supervision. This includes habits 
and vigilance. To maintain the latter, we preserve a certain amount of bodily 
tension (including muscle tone) that we cannot reduce until and unless we 
temporarily recuperate part of the implicit system for the explicit system; i.e. 
until and unless we reach a state of deep enough absorption. Reduced tension 
no doubt gives rise to pleasure, but I do not know whether reduced tension, 
even greatly reduced tension, suffices to explain the extreme pleasure that is 
so often claimed to accompany deep absorption.46
Clearly asceticism and martyrdom do not give rise to pleasure. Nor is there 
reason to assume that ascetics and martyrs pass much of their time (or any) in 
states of deep absorption. Ascetics and martyrs do not act the way they do be-
cause it gives them pleasure. It does not, at any rate not in the short term. Many 
of them, on the other hand, believe that it will do so in the long term. Does this 
explain their behavior? Are they looking for delayed gratification? Is their be-
havior of the kind that allows certain children not to eat the marshmallow that 
is put in front of them (Mischel 2014)? Perhaps they do, but I fail to convince 
myself that this can count as a fully satisfactory explanation. Is there some 
more general principle involved beyond the beliefs that ascetics and martyrs 
inherit from their specific religious or cultural traditions?
It seems relevant to remember that the transition from child consciousness 
to adult consciousness is a long and slow process. This process is unavoid-
able in any normal development into adulthood. However, is there perhaps a 
“counter current” that accompanies this process all along but works against it? 
Axel Michaels has argued in some publications (1997; 2006; 2011) that anxiety 
(Angst) is inseparable from religion; the two share a symbiotic relationship.47 
Is it possible that anxiety is the force that works against the process of be-
coming adult, that pushes people to find a “way back” through religious prac-
tice? Assuming the central importance of anxiety would have the advantage 
of explaining many forms of religious behavior, including those (such as as-
ceticism) that look problematic at first sight. For the time being, I prefer not to 
commit myself.48
46   See Birbaumer’s account of taking curare, which completely relaxes muscles (Birbaumer 
& Zittlau 2018: Loc 1513).
47   It seems that the specific form of anxiety that is death anxiety and religion do not share 
such a relationship; Jong & Halberstadt 2018.
48   Sterelny (2018: 408) observes: “Existential terror seems to have a much deeper history 
than religion, and hence does not explain religion.” This does not exclude that existential 
terror may have played a role in the development of religion.
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 Appendix 1: Reality
Deep absorption, we saw, can give access to an experience that may be felt as giving 
access to a reality different from the reality experienced in ordinary states of mind; 
this alternative reality may be experienced as more real. Philosophers since Plato 
have argued that our senses have no access to reality as it is. Immanuel Kant’s (1724-
1804) Critique of Pure Reason (Kant 1781/1998) updated this idea, and most recently 
Donald Hoffman (2019) has given it a different twist. In its most recent manifesta-
tion, it takes the form that Darwinian evolution has selected in favor of fitness, not 
truth. As a result we supposedly have no access whatsoever to reality: our sense organs 
present us with fitness payoffs, i.e., what is useful for survival and procreation, not 
with reality.
In this paper there is no need to take position with respect to this theory. What 
counts is that the “reality” to which deep absorption may be believed to give access has 
nothing to do with Kantian or neo-Kantian reality. Deep absorption may conceivably 
convince its subjects that what they experience is more real than what they experi-
ence in different mental states, but this should not be confused with access to the real-
ity that, according to Kantian and neo-Kantian theory, hides behind our perceptions, 
which lies “beyond the interface”.49
 Appendix 2: Meditation in the History of Buddhism
There is a common misunderstanding about meditation as it has supposedly been 
practiced throughout the history of Buddhism. Robert Sharf has convincingly argued 
(1995) that it is far from clear how many Buddhists actually meditated in historical 
times, perhaps far fewer than is often supposed, and that much the same is true even 
of those who wrote about meditational states: it is virtually unheard of in classical 
Buddhist literature that an author speaks about his or her own meditational experi-
ences. This impression is confirmed by the limited role that meditation plays in a num-
ber of contemporary Buddhist traditions. About Tibetan Buddhism, George Dreyfus 
states (2003: 168): “But how many monks meditate in the large Tibetan scholastic 
centers? Not many, it appeared to me.” And about Korean Buddhist, Robert Buswell 
observes (1992: 159): “the hwadu [which corresponds more or less to the Japanese koan, 
JB] is not intended to generate a state of samādhi …, but a state in which both the calm-
ness of samādhi and the perspicuity of prajñā are maintained. This … may account 
for the reason why I knew few Sŏn monks to have the ability in the deep meditative 
49   A reality that for Kant is inaccessible but consists of conscious agents according to 
Hoffman.
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absorptions, or dhyānas (Pali jhāna), that I had encountered before among the for-
est monks of Thailand.” About the authors of the Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya, a mas-
sive Buddhist text composed in India during the early centuries of the Common Era, 
Gregory Schopen (2000: 104 [15]) writes: “Unlike modern scholars, these ‘good’ monks 
did not have much good to say about monks who did engage in asceticism, meditation, 
and doctrinal learning. If they mention them at all—and they do so infrequently—it 
is almost always with a tone of marked ambivalence, if not actual ridicule. Ascetic 
monks, meditating monks, and learned monks appear in our Vinaya by and large only 
as slightly ridiculous characters in unedifying, sardonic, and funny stories or as nasty 
customers that ‘good’ monks do not want to spend much time around.” Attributing 
states of deep absorption to the individual authors of Buddhist texts is as risky as doing 
so in the case of Western mystical literature.
References
Alberini, Cristina M. and Alessio Travaglia (2017). Infantile amnesia: A critical period 
of learning to learn and remember. The Journal of Neuroscience 37(24): 5783-5795.
Ananthaswamy, Anil (2014). Trippy tots: How to see the world as a baby. New Scientist 
2983 (21 August 2014).
Antinori, Anna; Carter, L. Olivia, and Luke D. Smillie (2017): Seeing it both ways: 
Openness to experience and binocular rivalry suppression. Journal of Research in 
Personality 68: 15-22.
Atran, Scott (2002). In Gods We Trust: The Evolutionary Landscape of Religion. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Austin, James H. (1998). Zen and the Brain. Toward an Understanding of Meditation and 
Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, England: MIT Press.
Austin, James H. (2006). Zen-Brain Reflections: Reviewing Recent Developments in 
Meditation and States of Consciousness. Cambridge, Massachusetts & London, 
England: MIT Press.
Baier, Karl (2019). Meditation and contemplation: Two basic types of spiritual exer-
cises within Western European Christianity. In Elizabeth Harris and John O’Grady 
(eds.): Meditation in Buddhist-Christian Encounter. A critical analysis, 59-110. EOS—
Editions of Sankt Ottilien.
Banerjee, Konika, and Paul Bloom (2013). Would Tarzan believe in God? Conditions for 
the emergence of religious belief. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 17(1): 7-8.
Barrett, Lisa Feldman (2017). How Emotions are Made. The Secret Life of the Brain. 
London: Macmillan.
Berlin, Heather A. (2011). The neural basis of the dynamic unconscious. Neuro- 
psychoanalysis 13(1): 5-31.
34 10.1163/15700682-12341504 | Bronkhorst
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion  (2020) 1-41
Birbaumer, Niels, and Jörg Zittlau (2018). Thinking is Overrated. Empty Brain—happy 
brain. Translated by David Shaw. Melbourne-London: Scribe. (e-book).
Blom, Jan Dirk, and Iris E. C. Sommer (eds.) (2012). Hallucinations. Research and 
Practice. Berlin: Springer.
Bodhi, Bhikkhu (1995). The Middle Length Discourses of the Buddha: A New Translation 
of the Majjhima Nikaya. Original translation by Bhikkhu Nanamoli, translation 
edited and revised by Bhikkhu Bodhi. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Boudry, Maarten, Stefaan Blancke, and Massimo Pigliucci (2015). What makes weird 
beliefs thrive? The epidemiology of pseudoscience. Philosophical Psychology 28(8): 
1177-1198.
Boudry, Maarten, and Johan Braeckman (2012). How convenient! The epistemic ratio-
nale of self-validating belief systems. Philosophical Psychology 25(3): 341-364.
Boudry, Maarten, and Jerry Coyne (2016). Disbelief in belief: On the cognitive status of 
supernatural beliefs. Philosophical Psychology 29(4): 601-615.
Boyer, Pascal (2001). Religion Explained: The Evolutionary Origins of Religious Thought. 
New York: Basic Books. English edition: Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that 
Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors. London, Sydney, etc.: W. Heinemann.
Boyer, Pascal (2013). Why ‘belief ’ is hard work. Implications of Tanya Luhrmann’s When 
God talks back. HAU: Journal of Ethnographic Theory 3(3): 349-357.
Boyer, Pascal, and Pierre Liénard (2006). Why ritualized behavior? Precaution systems 
and action parsing in developmental, pathological and cultural rituals. Behavioral 
and Brain Sciences 29: 595-650.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (1993). The Two Traditions of Meditation in Ancient India. Second 
edition. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2001). The perennial philosophy and the law of karma. 
In C. C. Barfoot (ed.), Aldous Huxley between East and West, 175-189. Amsterdam and 
New York: Rodopi.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2001a). Asceticism, religion and biological evolution. Method & 
Theory in the Study of Religion 13: 374-418.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2007). Greater Magadha. Studies in the Culture of Early India. 
Leiden: Brill.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2009). Buddhist Teaching in India. Boston: Wisdom Publications.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2010). Ritual, holophrastic utterances, and the symbolic mind. 
In Axel Michaels and Anand Mishra (eds.), Ritual Dynamics and the Science of Ritual. 
Volume I: Grammar and morphologies of ritual practices in Asia, 159-202. Wiesbaden: 
Harrassowitz.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2011). Karma. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2012). Rites without symbols. Method & Theory in the Study of 
Religion 24: 236-266.
35The Religious Predisposition | 10.1163/15700682-12341504
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion  (2020) 1-41
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2012a): The symbolic mind. = Bronkhorst 2012b: 9-69. (An 
updated version of Bronkhorst 2010.)
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2012b): Absorption. Human Nature and Buddhist Liberation. 
Paris: UniversityMedia.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2016). What did Indian philosophers believe? In Piotr 
Balcerowicz (ed.), Logic and Belief in Indian Philosophy, 2nd rev. ed., 19-44. Online 
at: https://ia601506.us.archive.org/8/items/logicandbeliefinindianphilosophy2016/
Logic_and_Belief_in_Indian_Philosophy_2016.pdf
Bronkhorst, Johannes (2017). Can religion be explained? The role of absorption in vari-
ous religious phenomena. Method and Theory in the Study of Religion 29: 1-30.
Bronkhorst, Johannes (forthcoming). Buddhist meditation, flow and ritual. In Anand 
Singh (ed.), Rethinking Buddhism: Text, context and interpretations. Delhi: Primus 
Publishers.
Buswell, Robert E. (1992). The Zen Monastic Experience: Buddhist Practice in Contem-
porary Korea. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Chabris, Christopher, and Daniel Simons (2010). The Invisible Gorilla and Other Ways 
Our Intuition Deceives Us. London: HarperCollins.
Chou, Wei-Lun, and Su-Ling Yeh (2012). Object-based attention occurs regardless of 
object awareness. Psychonomic Bulletin & Review 19(2): 225-231.
Cox, Brian, and Andrew Cohen (2017). Forces of Nature. London: William Collins.
Craig, A. D. (2009). How do you feel—now? The anterior insula and human awareness. 
Nature Reviews, Neuroscience 10(1): 59-70.
Craig, A. D. (2015). How Do You Feel? An Interoceptive Moment with Your Neurobiological 
Self. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Damasio, Antonio (2010). Self Comes to Mind: Constructing the Conscious Brain. New 
York: Pantheon Books.
Dehaene, Stanislas, and Jean-Pierre Changeux (2011). Experimental and theoretical 
approaches to conscious processing. Neuron 70(3): 200-227.
Dennett, Daniel C. (1991). Consciousness Explained. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Dennett, Daniel C. (2017). From Bacteria to Bach and Back. The Evolution of Minds. 
London: Allen Lane.
Desimone, Robert, and John Duncan (1995). Neural mechanisms of selective visual at-
tention. Annual Review of Neuroscience 18: 193-222.
Dietrich, Arne, and Hilde Haider (2017). A neurocognitive framework for human cre-
ative thought. Frontiers in Psychology 7:2078. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2016.02078.
Dreyfus, Georges B. J. (2003). The Sound of Two Hands Clapping. Berkeley: University 
of California Press.
Elkins, David, Kenneth N. Anchor, and Howard M. Sandler (1979). Relaxation training 
and prayer behavior as tension reduction techniques. Behavioral Engineering 5(3): 
81-87.
36 10.1163/15700682-12341504 | Bronkhorst
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion  (2020) 1-41
Edmonston, William E. (1979). The effects of neutral hypnosis on conditioned respons-
es: Implications for hypnosis as relaxation. In Erika Fromm & Ronald E. Shor (eds.), 
Hypnosis: Research, Developments and Perspectives, 415-455. London: Routledge.
Everett, Caleb (2017). Numbers and the Making of Us. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press.
Eysenck, Michael W. (1982). Attention and Arousal. Cognition and Performance. 
Heidelberg: Springer.
Feinberg, Todd E., and John M. Mallatt (2016). The Ancient Origins of Consciousness. 
How the Brain Created Experience. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (Kindle edition).
Fischer, Hans (1965). Studien über Seelenvorstellungen in Ozeanien. München: Klaus 
Renner.
Franco, Eli (2018). On the arising of philosophical theories from spiritual practice. In 
Oliver von Criegern, Gudrun Melzer, and Johannes Schneider (eds.), Festschrift für 
Jens-Uwe Hartmann zum 65. Geburtstag, 113-126. Wien: Arbeitskreis für Tibetische 
und Buddhistische Studien Universität Wien.
Frith, Chris (2007). Making up the Mind. How the Brain Creates Our Mental World. 
Oxford: Blackwell.
Geertz, Armin W. (ed.) (2013). Origins of Religion, Cognition and Culture. Durham: 
Acumen.
Gopnik, A. (2009). The Philosophical Baby. What Children’s Minds Tell Us About Truth, 
Love, and the Meaning of Life. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Gorelik, Gregory (2016): The evolution of transcendence. Evolutionary Psychological 
Science 2: 287-307.
Gorelik, Gregory, and Todd K. Shackelford (2017). What is transcendence, how did it 
evolve, and is it beneficial? Religion, Brain & Behavior 7(4): 361-365
Hackett, Jeremiah M. (2013). A Companion to Meister Eckhart. Leiden: Brill.
Hardy, Alister (1979). The Spiritual Nature of Man. A Study of Contemporary Religious 
Experience. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hardy, Friedhelm (1983/2014): Viraha Bhakti. The Early History of Kṛṣṇa Devotion. Delhi: 
Motilal Banarsidass.
Hay, David (1990). Religious Experience Today. Studying the Facts. London: Mowbray.
Hobson, Nicholas M., Juliana Schroeder, Jane L Risen, Dimitris Xygalatas, and Michael 
Inzlicht (2018). The psychology of rituals: An integrative review and process-based 
framework. Personality and Social Psychology Review 22(3): 260-284.
Hochegger, Hermann (1965). Die Vorstellungen von ‘Seele’ und Totengeist bei afri-
kanischen Völkern. Anthropos 60: 273-339.
Hoffman, Donald D. (1998). Visual Intelligence. How we Create What We See. New York: 
W. W. Norton.
Hoffman, Donald D. (2012). The construction of visual reality. = Blom & Sommer 2012: 
7-15.
37The Religious Predisposition | 10.1163/15700682-12341504
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion  (2020) 1-41
Hoffman, Donald (2019). The Case Against Reality. Why Evolution Hid the Truth from 
Our Eyes. New York: W. W. Norton.
Hofstadter, Douglas, and Emmanuel Sander (2013). Surfaces and Essences: Analogy as 
the Fuel and Fire of Thinking. New York: Basic Books.
Hood, Bruce (2012). The Self Illusion. London: Constable.
Hultkrantz, Åke (1953). Conceptions of the Soul Among North American Indians. A Study 
in Religious Ethnology. Stockholm: The Ethnographical Museum of Sweden. (Cp. 
Hultkrantz 1997.)
Hultkrantz, Åke (1994). Gnostic parallels in America? A problem of identity, diffusion 
and independent invention. In Giulia Sfameni Gasparro (ed.), Ἀγαθὴ ἐλπίς: Studi 
Storico-Religiosi in Onore di Ugo Bianchi, 463-478. Roma: “L’Erma” di Bretschneider.
Hultkrantz, Åke (1997). Soul and Native Americans. Edited with a foreword by 
Robert Holland. Woodstock: Spring Publications. (Reduced and edited version of 
Hultkrantz, 1953.)
Huxley, Aldous (1947). The Perennial Philosophy. London: Chatto & Windus.
James, William (1902). The Varieties of Religious Experience. Reprint: Fount Paperbacks, 
Glasgow, 1979.
Jong, Jonathan, and Jamin Halberstadt (2018). Death Anxiety and Religious Belief. An 
Existential Psychology of Religion. London: Bloomsbury.
Kant, Immanuel (1781/1998). Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Paul 
Guyer and Allen W. Wood. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kimmel, Monica L. (2008). Interpreting Mysticism. An Evaluation of Steven T. Katz’s 
Argument Against a Common Core in Mysticism and Mystical Experience. Doctoral 
thesis, University of Gothenburg, Department of Religious Studies, Theology and 
Classical Philology.
Koch, Christof (2019). The Feeling of Life Itself. Why Consciousness is Widespread but 
Can’t be Computed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Kühl, Hjalmar S. et al. (90 authors) (2016). Chimpanzee accumulative stone throwing. 
Scientific Reports 6: 22219 (DOI: 10.1038/srep22219)
LeDoux, Joseph (2019). The Deep History of Ourselves. The Four-Billion-Year Story of How 
We Got Conscious Brains. New York: Viking.
Leech, Robert, Denis Mareschal, and Richard P. Cooper (2008). Analogy as relational 
priming: A developmental and computational perspective on the origins of a com-
plex cognitive skill. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31: 357-414.
Lotto, Beau (2017). Deviate. The Creative Power of Transforming Your Perception. London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson.
Luhrmann, T. M. (2005). The art of hearing God: Absorption, dissociation, and con-
temporary American spirituality. Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality 5(2): 
133-157.
Luhrmann, T. M., and Rachel Morgain (2012). Prayer as inner sense cultivation: An at-
tentional learning theory of spiritual experience. ETHOS 40(4): 359-389.
38 10.1163/15700682-12341504 | Bronkhorst
Method and Theory in the Study of Religion  (2020) 1-41
Luhrmann, T. M., Howard Nusbaum, and Ronald Thisted (2010). The absorption hy-
pothesis: learning to hear God in Evangelical Christianity. American Anthropologist 
112(1): 66-78.
Luhrmann, T. M., Howard Nusbaum, and Ronald Thisted (2013). ‘Lord, teach us to 
pray’: Prayer practice affects cognitive processing. Journal of Cognition and Culture 
13: 159-177.
Magee, Glenn Alexander (ed.) (2016). The Cambridge Handbook of Western Mysticism 
and Esotericism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
McCauley, Brea, David Maxwell, and Mark Collard (2018). A cross-cultural perspective 
on Upper Palaeolithic hand images with missing phalanges. Journal of Paleolithic 
Archaeology 1(4): 314-333.
Michaels, Axel (1997). Religionen und der neurobiologische Primat von Angst. 
In F. Stolz (ed.), Homo naturaliter religiosus?, 91-136. Bern: Peter Lang.
Michaels, Axel (2006). Religionen ohne Gottesfurcht? Angstbewältigung im 
Religionsvergleich. In Jan Baldewien and Hans Erich Loos (ed.), “Angst essen Seele 
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